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Abstract  This  paper  analyzes  whether  effective  boards  of  directors  in  addressing  shareholder
interests also  prove  to  be  effective  in  guaranteeing  the  interests  of  the  rest  of  the  ﬁrm’s
stakeholders.  We  measure  board  effectiveness  based  on  the  shareholder  perspective,  and  test
whether it  is  valid  for  the  stakeholder  perspective.  The  novelty  of  this  paper  precisely  lies  in  its
approach, given  that  it  considers  both  perspectives  of  corporate  governance  at  a  time.  Using
the transparency  of  sustainability  reports  as  a  proxy  for  the  stakeholder  perspective  in  an  inter-
national sample  of  2366  companies,  the  paper  shows  that  effective  boards  are  more  likely  to
address the  interests  of  both  the  shareholders  and  the  rest  of  the  ﬁrm’s  stakeholders.  Further-
more, we  propose  a  measure  of  board  effectiveness  by  gathering  several  board  characteristics.
Our results  contribute  to  research  on  corporate  governance  and  corporate  social  responsibility
reporting, and  it  has  implications  for  policy  makers.Sustainability
reports;
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his  paper  analyzes  whether  boards  of  directors  that  are
ffective  in  addressing  shareholder  interests  also  prove  to
e  effective  in  guaranteeing  the  interests  of  the  rest  of
he  ﬁrm’s  stakeholders.  We  propose  a  measure  of  board
ffectiveness  based  on  the  board  characteristics  that  con-
ribute  to  the  protection  of  shareholder  interests  under  the
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shareholder  perspective  of  corporate  governance  and  test
its  validity  under  the  stakeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s
corporate  governance.  According  to  Letza  et  al.  (2004),
the  shareholder  and  stakeholder  perspectives  are  the  most
relevant  approaches  for  analyzing  the  ﬁrm’s  corporate  gov-
ernance.  The  former  considers  that  the  key  aim  of  corporate
governance  is  the  protection  of  shareholder  interests.  The
latter  advocates  that  the  main  objective  of  corporate  gov-
ernance  is  to  guarantee  the  interests  of  all  of  the  ﬁrm’s
stakeholders.  This  approach  extends  the  scope  of  corporate
governance  by  considering  shareholders  as  a  type  of  stake-
holder  with  rights  equal  to  those  held  by  the  others  (Money
and  Schepers,  2007).
The  stakeholder  perspective  of  corporate  governance
is  strongly  linked  to  corporate  social  responsibility  (CSR)
(Jamali  et  al.,  2008).  CSR  aims  to  maximize  ‘‘.  .  .the  cre-
ation  of  shared  value  for  their  owners/shareholders  and  for
their  other  stakeholders  and  society  at  large’’  (European
Commission,  2011:6).  Therefore,  CSR  contributes  to  the  goal
of  corporate  governance  under  the  stakeholder  perspective.
The  establishment  of  governance  structures  related  to  CSR,
such  as  CSR  committees  and  reporting,  emphasizes  the  sig-
niﬁcant  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  CSR
(Money  and  Schepers,  2007).  Even  the  growing  literature  on
the  topic  highlights  the  crucial  role  of  corporate  governance
mechanisms,  especially  boards  of  directors,  in  establishing
CSR  practices  (Amran  et  al.,  2014;  Fernández  Sánchez  et  al.,
2011;  García-Sánchez  et  al.,  2015;  Khan  et  al.,  2013;  Webb,
2004).
Boards  are  responsible  for  monitoring  the  management
and  providing  it  with  strategic  advice.  Prior  research  on  the
effectiveness  of  boards  in  performing  these  tasks  has  mainly
relied  on  the  shareholder  perspective  (Finegold  et  al.,  2007;
John  and  Senbet,  1998;  Kiel  and  Nicholson,  2003;  Van  den
Berghe  and  Levrau,  2004).  These  papers  conclude  that
several  demographic  characteristics  of  boards  (e.g.  inde-
pendence,  female  directors,  the  separation  of  CEO  and
chairperson)  determine  board  effectiveness  in  promoting
shareholder  value.  In  fact,  most  of  them  are  suggested
in  Codes  of  Best  Practices  around  the  world.  Conversely,
research  on  board  effectiveness  under  the  stakeholder  per-
spective  is  scarce.  Several  papers  analyze  the  inﬂuence  of
board  characteristics  on  CSR  practices  and  reporting  (Amran
et  al.,  2014;  Garcia-Sanchez  et  al.,  2014;  Lattemann  et  al.,
2009;  Mallin  and  Michelon,  2011;  Prado-Lorenzo  et  al.,  2009;
Rodríguez-Ariza  et  al.,  2014),  without  taking  into  account
the  effect  of  these  board  characteristics  on  the  protection
of  shareholder  interests.  This  paper  contributes  to  ﬁlling
this  gap.  It  considers  both  perspectives  of  corporate  gov-
ernance  and  explores  whether  boards  that  are  effective  in
guaranteeing  shareholder  interests,  by  means  of  increas-
ing  shareholder  value,  are  also  effective  in  responding  to
the  interests  of  the  rest  of  the  stakeholders.  The  scope  of
corporate  governance  has  broadened  to  consider  all  stake-
holders  (Letza  et  al.,  2004),  so  it  seems  necessary  to  look
into  whether  the  effect  of  board  effectiveness  also  extends
to  and  guarantees  the  protection  of  all  stakeholder  inter-
ests.To  this  end,  we  measured  board  effectiveness  by  gath-
ering  in  a  single  variable  those  board  characteristics  that
contribute  to  the  aim  of  corporate  governance  under  the
shareholder  perspective.  To  assess  whether  stakeholder
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nterests  are  satisﬁed,  we  used  the  transparency  of  sustaina-
ility  reports  as  proxy  for  the  stakeholder  perspective.  The
ustainability  report  is  the  tool  most  widely  used  by  ﬁrms  to
isclose  CSR  information  (Fernandez-Feijoo  et  al.,  2014a).
y  means  of  providing  transparent  sustainability  reports,
rms  satisfy  the  information  interests  of  their  stakeholders
n  CSR  issues.  We  established  a  structural  equation  model
o  analyze  whether  board  effectiveness  under  the  share-
older  perspective  inﬂuences  the  stakeholder  perspective
f  the  ﬁrm’s  corporate  governance.  We  tested  our  model  in
n  international  sample  of  2366  ﬁrms  throughout  the  period
anging  from  2009  to  2012.  We  found  that  board  effec-
iveness  positively  affects  the  transparency  of  sustainability
eports.  This  result  implies  that  the  boards  which  are  effec-
ive  in  addressing  shareholder  interests  are  also  effective  in
rotecting  the  interests  of  all  the  ﬁrm’s  stakeholders.
This  paper  makes  several  contributions  to  research  on
orporate  governance  as  well  as  on  CSR  practices  and
eporting.  It  demonstrates  that  boards  beneﬁting  the  share-
olders  also  enhance  CSR  reporting  and  increase  the  ﬁrm’s
wareness  on  the  needs  of  the  rest  of  its  stakeholders.  It
lso  responds  to  the  call  to  improve  the  understanding  of
he  determinants  of  board  effectiveness  (Van  den  Berghe
nd  Levrau,  2004).  We  capture  board  effectiveness  in  a
ingle  variable  and  develop  a  quantiﬁable  measure  based
n  several  demographic  board  characteristics.  Our  measure
acilitates  assessment  and  allows  for  a  comparative  analysis
f  board  effectiveness  for  future  research.  Additionally,  we
emonstrate  that  the  conceptualization  and  measurement
f  board  effectiveness  under  the  shareholder  perspective
aintains  its  validity  under  the  stakeholder  perspective  of
orporate  governance.  Finally,  our  results  have  implications
or  policy  makers.  Codes  of  Best  Practice  all  over  the  world
re  suggesting  many  of  the  board  characteristics  driving
oard  effectiveness  based  on  the  shareholder  perspective.
ncluding  these  recommendations  not  only  helps  to  further
rotect  shareholder  interests,  but  it  also  guarantees  the
nterests  of  the  rest  of  stakeholders.
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  After  this  introduc-
ion,  the  following  section  reviews  previous  literature  on
oard  effectiveness  and  corporate  governance  perspectives
o  develop  the  hypothesis.  The  third  section  describes  the
ethodology,  while  fourth  section  introduces  and  discusses
ur  results.  Finally,  the  last  section  presents  the  conclusions
nd  limitations  of  the  study  and  suggests  further  research.
iterature review and hypothesis
evelopment
esearch  on  board  effectiveness  has  mostly  relied  on  clas-
ical  theories  of  corporate  governance,  such  as  agency,
tewardship  and  resource  dependence  theories  (Finegold
t  al.,  2007;  John  and  Senbet,  1998;  Kiel  and  Nicholson,
003;  Van  den  Berghe  and  Levrau,  2004).  These  theories
all  under  the  shareholder  perspective  as  they  advocate  that
he  aim  of  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  including  the
oard  of  directors,  is  to  increase  shareholder  value  and  pro-
ect  owner  interests  (Letza  et  al.,  2004).  Therefore,  this
ine  of  research  argues  that  board  effectiveness  depends  on
ow  well  the  boards  perform  their  monitoring  and  strate-
ic  advisory  roles  (Adams  et  al.,  2010;  Forbes  and  Milliken,
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999;  Kroll  et  al.,  2008;  Minichilli  et  al.,  2012).  Both  of
hese  roles  contribute  to  ﬁnancial  performance  in  response
o  shareholder  interests  (Duchin  et  al.,  2010;  Forbes  and
illiken,  1999;  John  and  Senbet,  1998).  According  to  de
ndres  et  al.  (2005),  board  characteristics  determining
oard  effectiveness  under  this  perspective  can  be  grouped
nto  three  categories:  size,  composition  and  internal
unctioning.
Regarding  board  size,  de  Andres  et  al.  (2005)  highlighted
hat  corporate  governance  rating  systems  agree  on  limiting
he  maximum  number  of  directors  because  large  boards  are
uboptimal,  whereas  small  boards  enhance  participation,
nvolvement  and  cohesiveness.  However,  they  noted  that  a
inimum  number  of  members  should  also  be  established  to
eet  the  proper  composition  in  terms  of  power  and  diver-
ity.  Newell  and  Wilson  (2002)  proposed  that  the  ideal  size
s  5  to  9  members.  This  suggestion  is  consistent  with  the
esults  of  prior  papers  that  found  both  positive  and  negative
elationships  between  board  size  and  board  effectiveness
Finegold  et  al.,  2007).  The  average  board  size  is  within  the
--9  range  in  the  papers  reporting  a  positive  relationship
Huse  et  al.,  2009;  Kiel  and  Nicholson,  2003).  Conversely,
he  average  sizes  in  the  studies  that  found  a  negative  rela-
ionship  were  either  above  or  below  this  range  (de  Andres
t  al.,  2005;  Eisenberg  et  al.,  1998;  Yermack,  1996).  There-
ore,  Newell  and  Wilson’s  (2002)  proposal  contributes  to
oard  effectiveness.  In  fact,  Codes  of  Best  Practices  in  sev-
ral  countries  (e.g.  Spain)  propose  a  minimum  and  maximum
hreshold  for  board  size.
Literature  on  board  composition  distinguishes  four  main
ssues:  independence,  CEO  duality,  presence  of  women
nd  directors’  experience.  Most  studies  support  a  positive
elationship  between  independence  and  the  board’s  moni-
oring  (Dahya  et  al.,  2002;  John  and  Senbet,  1998;  Klein,
002;  Renneboog,  2000;  Suchard  et  al.,  2001;  Tuggle  et  al.,
010)  and  strategic  advisory  roles  (Baysinger  et  al.,  1990;
ohnson  et  al.,  1993),  as  a  means  to  protect  shareholder
nterests.  Regarding  the  effect  of  board  independence  on
nancial  performance,  Duchin  et  al.  (2010)  concluded  that
he  cost  of  acquiring  information  for  outside  directors
oderates  this  relationship.  They  found  that  ﬁnancial  per-
ormance  improves  when  the  outside  directors’  cost  of
cquiring  information  is  low,  whereas  ﬁnancial  performance
orsens  when  this  cost  is  high.  Therefore,  board  inde-
endence  improves  ﬁnancial  performance  under  the  right
onditions.
CEO  duality  implies  substantial  power  for  the
EO/chairperson,  for  example,  by  allowing  that  per-
on  to  set  the  board  meeting  agendas  to  suit  his  or  her
nterests  and  thereby  avoid  intense  monitoring  (Jensen,
993;  Tuggle  et  al.,  2010).  Some  papers  reported  that  CEO
uality  has  a  negative  effect  on  ﬁnancial  performance
Coles  et  al.,  2001;  Rechner  and  Dalton,  1991).  Daily  and
alton  (1994)  concluded  that  ﬁrms  with  CEO  duality  are
ore  likely  to  go  bankrupt,  which  implies  that  it  jeopardizes
orporate  survival.  Regarding  the  boards’  monitoring  role,
uggle  et  al.  (2010)  reported  that  CEO  duality  weakens
he  relationship  between  poorer  prior  performance  and
ttention  to  monitoring.  Additionally,  CEO  duality  is  also
egatively  related  to  the  strategic  involvement  of  the  board
Ruigrok  et  al.,  2006).
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The  presence  of  female  directors  is  an  important  driver
f  board  effectiveness.  Boards  with  women  are  related  to
igher  ﬁnancial  performance  (Daily  and  Dalton,  2003;  Joecks
t  al.,  2013;  Smith  et  al.,  2006).  Adams  and  Ferreira  (2009)
oncluded  that  female  directors  are  better  monitors  than
en  because  they  attend  board  meetings  more  regularly,
romote  the  attendance  of  their  male  peers,  and  are  more
ikely  to  work  on  monitoring  committees.  These  authors
lso  indicate  that  women’s  intense  monitoring  inﬂuences
heir  positive  effect  on  ﬁnancial  performance.  A  major  pres-
nce  of  female  directors  only  improves  ﬁrm  performance
n  corporations  with  weak  shareholder  rights,  when  tougher
onitoring  is  necessary.  Women  are  more  sensitive  to  the
nterest  of  others  and  usually  consider  the  perspectives  of
ultiple  parties  (Terjesen  et  al.,  2009).  These  features  con-
ribute  to  the  strategic  advisory  role  of  boards  by  considering
ifferent  strategic  options  (Daily  and  Dalton,  2003),  improv-
ng  the  oversight  of  corporate  strategy  (Nielsen  and  Huse,
010),  and  enhancing  board  dynamics  (Kramer  et  al.,  2006).
Directors’  proﬁles  are  also  a  key  element  of  board
omposition  (Van  den  Berghe  and  Levrau,  2004).  Forbes  and
illiken  (1999)  argued  that  directors  should  have  functional
nd  ﬁrm-speciﬁc  experience  and  skills  to  increase  board
ffectiveness.  Kroll  et  al.  (2008)  found  that  ﬁrms  obtain
etter  outcomes  when  acquiring  other  companies  if  their
irectors  have  industry-speciﬁc  experience.  Similarly,  mar-
ets  react  positively  to  the  appointment  of  new  directors
hen  they  are  accounting  and  ﬁnance  experts  (Defond  et  al.,
005),  or  when  they  have  business  knowledge  and  experi-
nce  (Fich,  2005).  Directors’  experience  also  improves  the
onitoring  and  strategic  roles  of  boards.  Conger  et  al.  (1998)
oncluded  that  directors  require  appropriate  knowledge  to
evelop  their  tasks  effectively.  Kroll  et  al.  (2008)  posited
hat  directors  with  no  appropriate  expertise  become  less
nvolved  because  of  intellectual  constraints.
Board  meetings  and  board  committees  are  the  most
nalyzed  issues  in  relation  to  the  internal  functioning  of
oards.  The  frequency  of  meetings  is  related  to  the  inter-
al  administrative  structure  of  boards  (de  Andres  et  al.,
005).  According  to  Van  den  Berghe  and  Levrau  (2004),  board
eetings  are  a  procedural  aspect  that  improves  board  effec-
iveness  and  they  are  used  as  a proxy  for  board  activity.
afeas  (1999)  studied  how  the  number  of  meetings  affects
rm  performance.  He  found  that  boards  meet  more  regu-
arly  in  years  with  lower  performance.  Nonetheless,  years
ith  more  frequent  meetings  are  followed  by  an  increase
n  performance  in  subsequent  years.  This  result  suggests
hat  board  meetings  contribute  to  ﬁnancial  performance
n  the  long  term  and  that  monitoring  increases  when  ﬁrms
ace  problems.  Other  authors  agreed  with  this  conclusion
s  they  found  that  the  number  of  board  meetings  promote
oard  monitoring  (Conger  et  al.,  1998;  de  Andres  et  al.,
005).  Corporate  governance  rating  systems  and  Codes  of
est  Practices  promote  the  establishment  of  different  com-
ittees  to  improve  board  effectiveness  (Van  den  Berghe  and
evrau,  2004).  For  instance,  ﬁrms  with  audit  committees
nd  remuneration  committees  are  related  to  higher  perfor-
ance  (Chen  and  Nowland,  2010).  Klein  (1998)  argued  that
oard  committees  should  be  structured  in  two  categories
o  contribute  to  board  effectiveness:  monitoring  commit-
ees  (audit,  compensation  and  nomination  committees)  and
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productivity  committees  (ﬁnance,  investment  and  strategic
committees).
These  three  types  of  board  characteristics  (size,  composi-
tion  and  internal  functioning)  are  crucial  to  conceptualizing
and  determining  board  effectiveness  based  on  the  share-
holder  perspective.  Table  1  provides  a  summary  on
how  these  board  characteristics  inﬂuence  board  effec-
tiveness  outcomes  under  that  perspective  of  corporate
governance.
Since  the  late  20th  century,  academics  support  that  the
ﬁrm’s  corporate  governance  can  also  be  approached  from
a  stakeholder  perspective  (Letza  et  al.,  2004).  This  change
toward  a  stakeholder  viewpoint  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact
that  stakeholder  issues  have  been  included  in  Codes  of  Best
Practices  in  recent  years  (Szabó  and  Sørensen,  2013).  Based
on  the  stakeholder  theory  (Freeman,  1984),  this  perspec-
tive  argues  that  corporate  governance  should  guarantee  the
protection  of  the  interests  of  all  of  a  ﬁrm’s  stakeholders.
This  evolution  requires  revisiting  the  conceptualization  of
board  effectiveness  under  the  shareholder  perspective  to
assess  its  validity  for  the  stakeholder  perspective.  Initially,
the  two  perspectives  may  be  regarded  as  opposites,  given
that  satisfying  the  interests  of  the  rest  of  the  stakeholders
could  imply  giving  less  attention  to  shareholder  interests.
However,  they  should  be  considered  complementary.  The
stakeholder  perspective  does  not  promote  the  protection
of  stakeholder  interests  at  the  expense  of  the  protection  of
the  shareholder  interests.  It  extends  the  scope  of  corporate
governance  by  considering  shareholders  a  speciﬁc  type  of
stakeholder,  with  rights  equal  to  those  held  by  others  (Money
and  Schepers,  2007).  Given  this  broader  scope,  board  effec-
tiveness  based  on  the  shareholder  perspective  should  have  a
positive  effect  on  the  stakeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s
corporate  governance.
Additionally,  social  concerns  about  ﬁrms’  economic,  envi-
ronmental  and  social  impacts  have  grown  signiﬁcantly  over
the  last  decades  (Abeysekera,  2013;  Gray,  2006).  This  sit-
uation  requires  companies  to  legitimize  their  activities  to
guarantee  their  survival  (Deegan,  2002).  Firms  should  oper-
ate  in  a  way  that  beneﬁts  or,  at  least,  does  not  harm
society  to  gain  support  from  their  stakeholders.  Boards  of
directors  play  an  important  role  in  establishing  strategies
to  legitimize  ﬁrm  behavior,  especially  through  CSR  prac-
tices  and  reporting  (Khan  et  al.,  2013).  Therefore,  effective
boards  based  on  the  shareholder  perspective  should  be
effective  in  addressing  stakeholder  interests  and  increas-
ing  the  stakeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s  corporate
governance.
Finally,  Webb  (2004)  studied  the  structure  of  boards  of
directors  in  394  socially  responsible  ﬁrms  and  compares  it
to  the  structure  of  boards  in  a  matched  sample  of  non-
socially  responsible  ﬁrms.  She  found  socially  responsible
ﬁrms  have  boards  with  higher  proportion  of  women  and
outsiders  and  less  CEO  duality  than  non-socially  responsi-
ble  ﬁrms.  These  characteristics  are  some  of  the  drivers
of  board  effectiveness  under  the  shareholder  perspective.
Being  socially  responsible  is  a  way  of  responding  to  stake-
holder  interests;  hence,  we  expect  that  ﬁrms  with  effective
boards  in  protecting  shareholder  interests  may  be  also  more
effective  in  promoting  stakeholder  interests.
Based  on  the  arguments  presented  above,  we  propose  the
following  hypothesis:
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1.  Board  effectiveness  under  the  shareholder  perspective
ositively  affects  the  stakeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s
orporate  governance.
ethodology
ample  and  data  collection
nformation  on  boards  of  directors,  sustainability  reports
nd  ﬁrm  characteristics  was  collected  from  the  Asset4
atabase  (Thomson  Reuters  Datastream),  the  Global  Repor-
ing  Initiative  (GRI) database  and  corporate  webpages.
sset4  database  collects  and  uses  data  from  corporate
eports  and  websites,  as  well  as  from  other  publicly  avail-
ble  sources  to  offer  transparent,  objective,  auditable  and
ystematic  information  about  economic,  environmental  gov-
rnance  and  social  matters  to  assess  ﬁrm  performance
Schäfer  et  al.,  2006).  The  universe  of  Asset4  covers  over
000  listed  ﬁrms  worldwide.  GRI  is  the  organization  that
ssues  the  most  world  widely  used  guidelines  to  elabo-
ate  sustainability  reports  (Brown  et  al.,  2009;  Roca  and
earcy,  2012).  GRI  database  is  built  based  on  the  information
resented  by  the  ﬁrms  that  publish  sustainability  reports  fol-
owing  the  GRI  Guidelines.  GRI  database  covers  more  than
000  companies  that  have  published  at  least  one  sustaina-
ility  report  between  1999  and  2014.
Using  Asset4  as  primary  source,  we  selected  ﬁrms  from
he  countries  that  belong  to  the  two  main  corporate  gov-
rnance  models,  as  identiﬁed  by  Weimer  and  Pape  (1999):
he  market-oriented  and  the  network-oriented  models.  This
election  yielded  an  initial  sample  of  3351  companies.  For
hose  ﬁrms  that  disclose  sustainability  reports  following  the
RI  guidelines  according  to  Asset4,  we  collected  additional
ata  on  their  reports  from  the  GRI  database.  When  we
bserved  any  inconsistencies  between  the  Asset4  and  GRI
ata,  we  relied  on  the  information  provided  by  the  company
tself  through  its  website.
We  analyzed  the  years  spanning  from  2009  to  2012.  We
hose  2009  as  the  starting  year  because  it  was  the  ﬁrst  year
n  which  all  the  ﬁrms  in  our  sample  publishing  a  sustainability
eport  followed  the  most  recent  version  of  the  GRI  guidelines
t  the  time,  the  G3  version.  These  guidelines  were  released
n  2006,  so  some  ﬁrms  still  followed  the  G2  version  until
009  while  others  followed  the  G3  version.  We  only  included
he  ﬁrms  that  had  data  on  all  the  variables  for  at  least  one
ear  in  our  ﬁnal  sample.  We  established  this  requirement
nstead  of  having  data  for  all  four  years  to  include  the  ﬁrms
hat  might  have  disappeared  during  the  period.  Thus,  we
voided  survival  bias.  After  this  adjustment,  our  ﬁnal  sample
onsisted  of  2366  ﬁrms  with  all  the  data  available  for  at
east  one  year,  and  it  included  8546  ﬁrm-year  observations
hroughout  the  period  ranging  from  2009  to  2012.
ariables
he  dependent  and  independent  variables  are  two  latent
onstructs  that  are  not  directly  observable  by  nature.  There-
ore,  their  measurement  requires  the  establishment  of  a  set
f  observable  indicators  that  are  related  to  how  the  latent
ariables  behave.  The  relationship  between  the  latent  varia-
les  and  their  indicators,  known  as  epistemic  relationship,
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Table  1  Effect  of  board  characteristics  on  board  effectiveness  outcomes  under  the  shareholder  perspective.
Board  characteristic  Corporate
performance
Monitoring  Strategic
advice
Supported  by
Board  size  (5--9)  +  +  +  de  Andres  et  al.  (2005),  Kiel  and  Nicholson  (2003),
Newell  and  Wilson  (2002),  Nielsen  and  Huse  (2010)
Independence  +  +  +  Baysinger  et  al.  (1990),  Dahya  et  al.  (2002),  Duchin
et al.,  2010,  John  and  Senbet  (1998),  Johnson  et  al.
(1993),  Klein  (2002),  Renneboog  (2000),  Suchard  et  al.
(2001)
CEO  duality  −  −  −  Coles  et  al.  (2001),  Daily  and  Dalton  (1994),  Jensen
(1993),  Rechner  and  Dalton  (1991),  Ruigrok  et  al.
(2006),  Tuggle  et  al.  (2010)
Women +  +  +  Adams  and  Ferreira  (2009),  Daily  and  Dalton  (2003),
Erhardt  et  al.  (2003),  Joecks  et  al.  (2013), Kramer  et  al.
(2006),  Nielsen  and  Huse  (2010),  Smith  et  al.  (2006)
Experience  +  +  +  Conger  et  al.  (1998),  Defond  et  al.  (2005),  Fich  (2005),
Kroll  et  al.  (2008)
Meetings  −  (current
year)
+  (subsequent
years)
+  N/A  Conger  et  al.  (1998),  de  Andres  et  al.  (2005),  Vafeas
(1999),  Van  den  Berghe  and  Levrau  (2004)
Committees  +  +  +  Chen  and  Nowland  (2010),  Klein  (1998),  Van  den  Berghe
and Levrau  (2004)
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an  be  formative  or  reﬂective  (Diamantopoulos  and  Siguaw,
006).  A  formative  relationship  is  causal,  whereby  changes
n  the  latent  variable  are  determined  by  changes  in  its
ndicators,  the  so-called  formative  indicators.  A reﬂective
elationship  is  consequential,  whereby  changes  in  the  latent
ariable  are  reﬂected  in  changes  in  its  indicators,  the  so-
alled  reﬂective  indicators.  Based  on  this  distinction,  we
stablished  the  following  measurement  models  for  each
ariable.
ependent  variable
takeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s  corporate  governance
s  the  dependent  variable.  We  used  the  transparency  of
ustainability  reports,  proposed  by  Fernandez-Feijoo  et  al.
2014b),  as  a  proxy  for  our  dependent  variable.  The  sus-
ainability  report  is  the  most  common  tool  that  ﬁrms  use  to
rovide  their  stakeholders  with  CSR  disclosures  and  satisfy
heir  interests  in  receiving  transparent  and  reliable  infor-
ation.  According  to  Fernandez-Feijoo  et  al.  (2014b), the
ransparency  of  sustainability  reports  is  the  reﬂection  of
our  characteristics  assessing  the  content  and  quality  of  sus-
ainability  reports  following  GRI  guidelines:  frequency  of
eporting,  level  of  application  of  the  GRI  guidelines,  decla-
ation  of  the  level  and  assurance.  Despite  ‘‘greenwashing’’
r  legitimating  motivations  for  disclosing  CSR  information,
rior  research  highlighted  that  the  quality  and  content  of
ustainability  reports  reﬂect  CSR  practices  and  behavior  (De
a  Cuesta-González  et  al.,  2006;  Fernandez-Feijoo  et  al.,
014a;  De  Godos  Díez  et  al.,  2012).  Moreover,  transparency,
hrough  the  disclosure  of  information  to  stakeholders,  is  one
f  the  most  important  principles  of  corporate  governance
Gaa,  2009).  Therefore,  the  transparency  of  sustainability
eports  is  an  appropriate  proxy  to  assess  the  stakeholder
erspective  of  a  ﬁrm’s  corporate  governance.
a
(
s
eTo  assess  transparency,  Fernandez-Feijoo  et  al.  (2014b)
athered  the  four  characteristics  mentioned  above  in  a
ingle  variable.  They  measured  frequency  of  reporting  by
omputing  the  average  number  of  sustainability  reports  that
ach  ﬁrm  published,  with  respect  to  the  number  of  years
nalyzed.  They  measured  the  other  three  characteristics
level  of  application,  declaration  of  the  level  and  assurance)
y  computing  the  average  number  of  times  that  the  sus-
ainability  report  fulﬁlled  each  characteristic  with  respect
o  the  number  of  sustainability  reports  published  by  each
rm  during  the  period.  We  followed  Fernandez-Feijoo  et  al.
2014b)  methodology  to  measure  these  characteristics.  We
eﬁned  a  reﬂective  measurement  model  using  them  as  indi-
ators,  given  that  the  level  of  transparency  of  sustainability
eports  is  a  consequence  of  changes  in  these  indicators.  The
ransparency  of  a ﬁrm’s  sustainability  report,  and  hence  its
takeholder  perspective,  is  reﬂected  on  the  frequent  disclo-
ure  of  sustainability  reports,  the  high  level  of  application
f  the  GRI  guidelines,  the  declaration  of  that  level  by  a
hird-party  and  the  assurance  of  the  sustainability  report.
ndependent  variable
oard  effectiveness,  based  on  the  shareholder  perspec-
ive  of  corporate  governance,  is  the  independent  variable.
ccording  to  the  literature  review,  we  established  a  for-
ative  measurement  model  using  the  board  characteristics
etermining  board  effectiveness  as  indicators.  These  char-
cteristics  are  causally  related  to  board  effectiveness.  They
etermine  the  effectiveness  of  boards  in  developing  their
oles  under  the  shareholder  perspective,  in  order  to  guar-
ntee  shareholder  interest  and  increase  shareholder  value
see  Table  1).  Speciﬁcally,  the  formative  indicators  are
ize  and  independence  of  the  board,  CEO  duality,  pres-
nce  of  women  on  boards,  directors’  experience,  number  of
ctiv
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meetings  and  the  establishment  of  speciﬁc  board  commit-
tees  (one  indicator  per  type  of  committee).  Similarly  to
the  measurement  of  the  dependent  variable,  we  deﬁned
each  board  characteristic  as  the  average  ﬁgure  for  its  value
between  2009  and  2012.  A  reﬂective  measurement  model
could  have  also  been  established  using  the  outcomes  of
board  effectiveness  as  indicators,  such  as  ﬁnancial  perfor-
mance.  However,  these  outcomes  may  be  inﬂuenced  by
factors  other  than  only  by  board  effectiveness.  So  if  we
used  them  as  reﬂective  indicators,  we  could  have  captured
other  elements  unrelated  to  board  effectiveness.  Thus,  a
formative  measurement  model  for  board  effectiveness  was
seemingly  better.
Control  variables
We  included  three  additional  variables  (ﬁrm  size,  indus-
try  and  country  orientation)  to  control  for  their  effect  on
the  stakeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s  corporate  gover-
nance,  measured  as  the  transparency  of  the  sustainability
report.  Prior  research  agreed  on  a  positive  effect  of  ﬁrm
size  on  CSR  reporting  (Fifka,  2013;  Hahn  and  Kühnen,  2013).
Companies  that  operate  in  environmentally  sensitive  indus-
tries  disclose  better  CSR  information  (Brammer  and  Pavelin,
2008;  Young  and  Marais,  2012).  Finally,  ﬁrms  from  countries
with  a  stakeholder-oriented  system  of  corporate  governance
(code  law  countries)  provide  more  transparent  and  reliable
information  by  means  of  assuring  their  sustainability  report
than  do  those  from  countries  with  a  shareholder-oriented
system  of  corporate  governance  (common  law  countries)
(Simnett  et  al.,  2009).
We  used  the  average  logarithm  of  assets  and  sales  during
the  periods  as  indicators  for  ﬁrm  size.  Regarding  envi-
ronmentally  sensitive  industries,  we  used  a  dichotomous
variable  as  indicator.  It  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  ﬁrm
operates  in  an  industry  that  has  an  important  impact  on  the
environment.  Following  Castelo  Branco  and  Lima  Rodrigues
(2008),  Fernandez-Feijoo  et  al.  (2014a,b)  and  Gamerschlag
et  al.  (2011),  we  coded  the  following  industries  as  environ-
mentally  sensitive:  Applied  resources,  Automobile  &  auto
parts,  Chemicals,  Energy  --  fossil  fuels,  Industrial  &  con-
glomerates  services,  Industrial  conglomerates,  Industrial
goods,  Mineral  resources,  Renewable  energy,  Transporta-
tion,  Uranium  and  Utilities.  Finally,  we  used  a  dichotomous
variable  that  distinguishes  whether  the  ﬁrm  comes  from  a
country  with  a  stakeholder-oriented  system  of  corporate
governance  as  an  indicator  for  the  country’s  corporate  gov-
ernance  system.  According  to  Weimer  and  Pape  (1999),
the  market-oriented  system  comprises  Australia,  Canada,
United  Kingdom  and  USA;  while  the  network-oriented  sys-
tems  includes  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,
Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain,  Sweden
and  Switzerland.  The  countries  in  the  ﬁrst  group  are  common
law  countries,  with  a  shareholder-oriented  corporate  gover-
nance  model  whereas  the  countries  in  the  latter  group  are
code  law  countries,  with  a  stakeholder-oriented  corporate
governance  model  (Ball  et  al.,  2000).  We  deﬁned  a  reﬂec-
tive  measurement  model  for  each  control  variable  using
these  indicators  given  that  they  are  outcomes  reﬂecting  the
behavior  of  the  control  variables.
Table  2  summarizes  the  measurement  models  for  each
variable  and  the  deﬁnitions  of  their  indicators.  Additionally,
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ig.  1  graphically  describes  the  established  measurement
nd  structural  models.
tatistical  analysis
ur  dependent  and  independent  variables  are  two  latent
onstructs  that  cannot  be  measured  directly.  Therefore,
e  used  a  structural  equation  model  analysis  to  test  the
nﬂuence  of  board  effectiveness  on  the  stakeholder  perspec-
ive.  This  technique  allows  us  to  determine  the  relationship
etween  latent  variables  using  data  from  observable  indi-
ators  (Williams  et  al.,  2009).  Structural  equation  models
an  be  analyzed  through  two  different  sets  of  techniques:
ovariance-based  methods  and  variance-based  methods.  In
his  study,  we  opted  for  a  partial  least  squares  regression
PLS),  a  variance-based  method,  for  the  following  reasons
Chin,  2010;  Roldán  and  Sánchez-Franco,  2012).  First,  we
nclude  a  formative  latent  variable  (BE)  that  can  only  be
odeled  using  a  PLS.  Second,  PLS  focuses  on  the  predic-
ion  of  the  dependent  variable;  hence  it  may  be  preferably
sed  for  a  causal-predictive  analysis.  Finally,  PLS  requires
oft  distributional  assumptions  for  the  data  which  makes
t  applicable  to  a wide  range  of  samples.  The  PLS  analysis
as  performed  using  the  SMART  PLS  2.0  M3  software  (Ringle
t  al.,  2005).
esults and discussion
escriptive  statistics
able  3  presents  a  descriptive  summary  of  the  indicators
f  each  measurement  model.  Panel  A  shows  the  descrip-
ive  statistics  of  the  indicators  that  are  continuous  variables
hile  Panel  B  presents  the  frequencies  of  the  dichotomous
ndicators.  In  terms  of  the  stakeholder  perspective,  the  ﬁrms
ublished  a  sustainability  report  in  30.3%  of  the  analyzed
ears  on  average.  With  respect  to  the  number  of  sustaina-
ility  reports  that  were  published,  7.41%  of  them  achieved
he  A  level  of  the  GRI  guidelines,  11.3%  were  assured  and  the
evel  of  10.8%  of  the  reports  was  declared  by  a  third-party.
Concerning  board  effectiveness,  48.7%  of  boards  had  a
ize  within  the  range  of  5--9  members  suggested  by  Newell
nd  Wilson  (2002).  On  average,  outsiders  and  women  repre-
ented  78.63%  and  the  11.52%  of  the  directors,  respectively.
he  chairperson  was  not  the  CEO  at  the  same  time  in  30.7%
f  the  ﬁrms  throughout  the  period.  The  proportion  of  direc-
ors  with  ﬁnancial  or  industry-speciﬁc  experience  totaled
0%.  Most  boards  had  established  audit,  compensation  and
omination  committees  (99.0%,  92.9%  and  87.2%  of  the
oards  had  one  of  them  on  average,  respectively).  How-
ver,  only  55.1%  and  57.6%  of  the  boards  had  established
orporate  governance  and  CSR  committees  during  over  the
eriod.
Regarding  control  variables,  the  average  logarithms  of
ssets  and  sales  were  15.93  and  15.12.  Firms  operating  in
nvironmentally-sensitive  industries  represent  the  45.90%
f  the  sample.  Finally,  29.6%  of  the  companies  were  from
ountries  with  a  stakeholder-oriented  model  of  corporate
overnance.
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Table  2  Block  of  indicators  for  each  construct  and  their  deﬁnition.
Construct/indicator  Deﬁnition
Stakeholder  perspective  (reﬂective  construct)
Frequency  Average  number  of  sustainability  reports  published  by  a  ﬁrm,  with  respect
to the  number  of  years  in  the  period
Level of  application  Average  number  of  times  when  the  ﬁrm’s  CSR  report  got  an  A,  the
maximum  level  according  to  GRI  Guidelines,  with  respect  to  the  number  of
sustainability  reports  that  it  published  during  the  period
Declaration  of  level  Average  number  of  times  when  the  level  of  the  ﬁrm’s  sustainability  report
was declared  by  GRI  or  a  third  party,  with  respect  to  the  number  of
sustainability  reports  that  it  published  during  the  period
Assurance Average  number  of  times  when  the  ﬁrm  issued  an  assurance  statement,
with respect  to  the  number  of  sustainability  reports  that  it  published
during  the  period
Board effectiveness  (formative  construct)
Board  size  (5--9) Average  number  of  years  when  the  size  of  the  board  was  within  the  range
of 5  to  9  member,  respect  to  the  number  of  years  in  the  period
Independence  Average  percentage  of  outsiders  during  the  period
CEO-duality  Average  number  of  years  when  the  CEO  was  not  the  chairperson  at  the
same time,  respect  to  the  number  of  years  in  the  period
Women Average  percentage  of  women  directors  during  the  period
Experience Average  percentage  of  board  members  during  the  period  who  had  either  an
industry speciﬁc  background  or  a  strong  ﬁnancial  background
Meetings Average  number  of  years  when  the  number  of  board  meetings  was  higher
than the  mean  for  the  entire  sample,  respect  to  the  number  of  years  in  the
period
Audit committee  Average  number  of  years  that  the  board  had  an  audit  committee,  respect
to the  number  of  years  in  the  period
Compensation  committee  Average  number  of  years  that  the  board  had  a  compensation  committee,
respect  to  the  number  of  years  in  the  period
Nomination  committee  Average  number  of  years  that  the  board  had  a  nomination  committee,
respect to  the  number  of  years  in  the  period
Corporate  governance  committee  Average  number  of  years  that  the  board  had  a  corporate  governance
committee,  respect  to  the  number  of  years  in  the  period
CSR committee  Average  number  of  years  that  the  board  had  a  CSR  committee,  respect  to
the number  of  years  in  the  period
Firm size  (reﬂective  construct)
Assets  Average  logarithm  of  the  ﬁrm’s  total  assets  during  the  period
Sales Average  logarithm  of  the  ﬁrm’s  total  sales  during  the  period
Industry (reﬂective  construct)
Environmentally  sensitive  industry  Dichotomous  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  ﬁrm  belongs  to  an
environmentally  sensitive  industry  and  0  otherwise
Country orientation  (reﬂective  construct)
Stakeholder-oriented  Dichotomous  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  ﬁrm  is  from  a
stakeholder-oriented  country  (code  law)  and  0  if  the  ﬁrm  is  from  a
shareholder-oriented  country  (common  law)
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ceasurement  model
ollowing  Chin  (2010),  we  analyzed  the  results  of  the  PLS
nalysis  in  two  steps.  First,  we  evaluated  the  validity  and
eliability  of  the  measurement  models  of  the  constructs.
ach  type  of  measurement  model  (formative  or  reﬂec-
ive)  was  analyzed  based  on  different  criteria  (Mathieson
t  al.,  2001).  Thus,  we  evaluated  the  measurement  model  of
he  formative  construct  before  analyzing  the  measurement
F
F
e
codels  of  the  reﬂective  constructs.  Afterwards,  we  moved
o  the  second  step  of  the  PLS  results  and  analyzed  the  struc-
ural  model,  which  determines  the  relationship  between  the
onstructs.ormative  construct  (Board  effectiveness)
ormative  measurement  models  are  assessed  at  two  lev-
ls:  at  the  construct  level  (whether  the  formative  construct
arries  the  intended  meaning)  and  at  the  indicator  level
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Figure  1  Measurement  and  structural  models.
Table  3  Descriptive  summary  of  the  indicators.
Panel  A.  Descriptive  statistics  for  the  continuous  variables
Mean  Standard  deviation  Minimum  Maximum
Frequency  0.303  0.415  0.000  1.000
Level of  application  0.074  0.247  0.000  1.000
Declaration  of  level  0.108  0.268  0.000  1.000
Assurance 0.113  0.293  0.000  1.000
Board size  (5--9)  0.487  0.450  0.000  1.000
Outsiders 0.786  0.206  0.000  1.000
CEO duality  0.307  0.419  0.000  1.000
Women 0.115  0.101  0.000  0.578
Experience 0.605  0.201  0.000  1.000
Meetings 0.432  0.417  0.000  1.000
Audit committee  0.990  0.091  0.000  1.000
Compensation  committee  0.929  0.247  0.000  1.000
Nomination committee  0.872  0.319  0.000  1.000
Corporate governance  committee  0.551  0.493  0.000  1.000
CSR committee  0.576  0.459  0.000  1.000
Assets 15.933  2.349  9.881  26.051
Sales 15.121  2.767  0.000  23.681
Panel B.  Frequencies  of  the  dichotomous  variables
1  0
Environmentally-sensitive  industry  0.459  0.541
Country orientation  0.296  0.704
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Table  4  Analysis  of  the  nomological  validity  of  the  forma-
tive construct.
Model  Path
coefﬁcient
t-value
(bootstrap)
Board  effectiveness  →  ROA  0.190*** 5.290
Board  effectiveness  →  ROE  0.079* 2.183
Board  effectiveness  →  MtB  0.070* 1.832
ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; MtB market-to-
book ratio.
* p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
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ﬁrm’s  corporate  governance.  Therefore,  we  accept  our*** p < 0.001 (based on t (4999, one-tailed test)).
whether  the  indicators  contribute  to  the  construct  by  car-
ying  the  intended  meaning)  (Henseler  et  al.,  2009).  At
he  construct  level,  external  validity  requires  determin-
ng  whether  the  formative  measurement  model  explains
 high  percentage  of  the  variance  of  the  same  construct
easured  by  the  reﬂective  indicators.  To  our  knowledge,
here  are  no  alternative  measures  of  board  effectiveness
hrough  reﬂective  indicators.  Thus,  we  could  not  assess  the
xternal  validity  and  we  moved  on  to  the  next  step  (Chin,
010).  Nomological  validity  involves  assessing  the  relation-
hip  between  the  formative  construct  and  other  variables,
s  identiﬁed  by  prior  research  (Henseler  et  al.,  2009).  Sev-
ral  studies  have  argued  that  board  effectiveness  under  the
hareholder  perspective  leads  to  higher  ﬁrm  performance
Duchin  et  al.,  2010;  John  and  Senbet,  1998).  Therefore,
e  checked  the  relationship  between  our  formative  con-
truct  and  three  proxies  for  ﬁrm  performance  (ROA,  ROE
nd  market-to-book  ratio)  (Table  4).  The  results  show  the
xpected  positive  and  signiﬁcant  effect  of  board  effective-
ess  in  the  three  cases.  Although  the  path  coefﬁcients  are
f  small  magnitude,  they  are  signiﬁcant  due  to  the  large  size
f  the  sample.
At  the  indicator  level,  potential  multicollinearity  among
he  indicators  should  be  analyzed  ﬁrst  because  it  might
ield  unstable  estimates  (Mathieson  et  al.,  2001).  To  test
or  multicollinearity  between  the  formative  indicators,  we
alculated  the  variance  inﬂation  factor  (VIF)  using  SPSS
.20.  Table  5  presents  the  main  statistics  used  to  assess  the
easurement  models  of  both  the  formative  and  reﬂective
onstructs.  As  shown  in  the  table,  there  is  no  multicollinear-
ty  because  our  highest  VIF  (1.944)  is  below  the  threshold  of
.3  suggested  by  Roberts  and  Thatcher  (2009).  Afterwards,
e  evaluated  the  weights  of  the  formative  indicators,  which
ank  their  contribution  in  building  the  construct.  Table  5
hows  that  six  indicators  signiﬁcantly  contribute  to  the  con-
truct.  The  weights  are  calculated  through  a  regression  of
he  latent  variable  scores  with  the  formative  indicators
s  independent  variables  (Hair  et  al.,  2014).  This  method
eveals  that  three  indicators,  despite  having  the  lowest
egative  weights,  are  signiﬁcant  because  they  also  have  neg-
tive  loadings.  Indicators  with  no  signiﬁcant  weights  should
ot  be  removed  due  to  statistical  results  as  long  as  their
nclusion  is  justiﬁed  (Henseler  et  al.,  2009).  Thus,  we  left  the
ve  indicators  that  had  no  signiﬁcant  weights  because  their
nclusion  was  supported  by  previous  research,  as  previously
iscussed.
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Based  on  this  assessment,  we  concluded  that  the  forma-
ive  measurement  model  for  board  effectiveness,  based  on
he  shareholder  perspective,  is  valid.
eﬂective  constructs  (stakeholder  perspective  of  the
rm’s  corporate  governance,  ﬁrm  size,  industry,  and
ountry  orientation)
eﬂective  measurement  models  are  assessed  based  on  their
eliability  and  validity  (Chin,  2010).  Individual  item  reli-
bility  evaluates  the  component  of  the  variance  of  the
ndicator  explained  by  the  construct.  To  meet  this  criterion,
he  construct  should  explain  at  least  50%  of  the  variance
f  the  indicator,  which  implies  that  the  indicator  has  a
oading  above  0.707.  Therefore,  all  of  the  reﬂective  indi-
ators  fulﬁlled  individual  item  reliability  (Table  5).  The
ext  step  focuses  on  the  construct  reliability,  which  deter-
ines  whether  all  of  the  reﬂective  indicators  of  a  construct
easure  the  same  latent  variable.  The  four  reﬂective  con-
tructs  meet  this  requirement  as  the  Cronbach’s  alpha  and
he  composite  reliability  are  both  above  the  suggested  0.7
hreshold.
In  terms  of  validity,  convergent  validity  implies  that  each
lock  of  reﬂective  indicators  stands  for  the  one  and  only
onstruct  they  are  supposed  to  measure  (Henseler  et  al.,
009).  To  satisfy  convergent  validity,  the  average  variance
xtracted  (AVE)  should  be  above  0.5  (Fornell  and  Larcker,
981).  Thus,  the  four  reﬂective  constructs  achieve  conver-
ent  validity  (Table  5).  Finally,  discriminant  validity  requires
hat  the  different  conceptual  constructs  be  sufﬁciently  dif-
erent  from  each  other  (Henseler  et  al.,  2009).  Discriminant
alidity  is  demonstrated  when  the  square  root  of  the  AVE
f  a  construct  is  higher  than  the  correlations  between  this
onstruct  and  the  others.  Table  6  presents  comparative
quare  roots  of  the  AVEs  and  the  correlations  between  the
onstructs.  The  results  show  that  discriminant  validity  is  ful-
lled.  These  outputs  indicate  that  each  reﬂective  construct
s  more  strongly  related  to  its  indicator  than  to  the  other
onstructs.
Therefore,  based  on  our  evaluation  of  the  four  criteria,
he  measurement  models  of  the  four  reﬂective  constructs
re  valid  and  reliable.
tructural  model
ig.  2  presents  the  R2  of  the  dependent  variable  and  the  path
oefﬁcients  of  the  exogenous  variables.  The  R2  evaluates
he  predictive  power  of  the  structural  model  (Chin,  2010).
ur  model  has  a  R2  of  31.9%,  which  is  close  to  the  moderate
rediction  level  of  33%  suggested  by  Chin  (1998).
We  used  a  bootstrapping  procedure  of  5000  resamples
o  test  the  signiﬁcance  of  the  path  coefﬁcients  and  calcu-
ate  the  conﬁdence  intervals.  Table  7  presents  the  results
f  the  regression,  the  bootstrapping,  and  the  variance  of
he  dependent  variable  explained  by  each  exogenous  vari-
ble.  The  t-values  and  the  conﬁdence  intervals  both  show
hat  the  four  exogenous  variables  have  a  positive  and  sig-
iﬁcant  inﬂuence  on  the  stakeholder  perspective  of  theypothesis.  In  particular,  board  effectiveness  (path  =  0.440,
-value  = 21.003)  has  the  most  important  effect  given  that
t  explains  23.257%  of  the  variance  of  the  dependent  vari-
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Table  5  Analysis  of  formative  and  reﬂective  measurement  models.
Construct/indicator Formative  construct  Reﬂective  constructs
Indicator  level  Reliability  Convergent
validity
VIF  Weight  Loading  Cronbach’s
alpha
Composite
reliability
AVE
Transparency  of
CSR  reporting
(reﬂective
construct)
0.850  0.896  0.684
Frequency 0.826
Level of
application
0.776
Declaration  of
level
0.834
Assurance  0.868
Board
effectiveness
(Formative
construct)
N/A  N/A  N/A
Board size  (5--9)  1.198  −0.253***  −0.466
Outsiders  2.162  0.210**  0.207
CEO duality  1.205  0.099  0.162
Women 1.292  −0.024  0.292
Experience  1.534  −0.290***  −0.494
Meetings  1.173  0.149**  0.129
Audit
committee
1.129  0.055  0.007
Compensation
committee
1.944  −0.029  0.007
Nomination
committee
1.931 −0.047  0.068
Corporate
governance
committee
1.539 −0.133* −0.179
CSR  committee  1.150  0.750***  0.863
Firm size
(reﬂective
construct)
0.914  0.959  0.920
Assets 0.965
Sales 0.954
Industry
(reﬂective
construct)
1.000  1.000  1.000
Environmentally
sensitive
industry
1.000
Country
orientation
(reﬂective
construct)
1.000 1.000  1.000
Stakeholder-
oriented
1.000
N/A: not applicable.
Weight signiﬁcant at * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (based on t(4999, two-tailed test)).
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Table  6  Discriminant  validity  of  the  reﬂective  constructs.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
(1)  Transparency  of  CSR  reporting  0.827
(2) Board  effectiveness  0.528  N/A
(3) Firm  size  0.311  0.359  0.959
(4) Industry  0.070  0.060  −0.106  1.000
(5) Country  orientation  0.352  0.342  0.476  0.003  1.000
Elements in the diagonal (bold) are the square roots of the AVE.
Off-diagonal elements are the correlations among the constructs.
N/A: not applicable.
Table  7  Effects  on  transparency  of  CSR  reporting.
Exogenous  variable  Path  coefﬁcient  t-value  (bootstrap)  Conﬁdence  interval  (95%)  Explained  variance
Board  effectiveness 0.440*** 21.003  (0.406;  0.487)  23.257%
Firm size 0.081** 3.045  (0.027;  0.131)  2.529%
Industry 0.052* 2.028 (0.001;  0.102)  0.367%
Country orientation 0.163*** 5.197 (0.100;  0.223) 5.727%
R2  =  31.9%
Q2  =  0.193
The signiﬁcance of the path coefﬁcients and their conﬁdence intervals were calculated using a bootstrapping procedure of 5000
resamples.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001 (based on t(4999, one-tailed test)).
Board
effectiveness
0.440∗∗∗
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0.163∗∗∗ 0.052 ∗
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**p <  0.001  (based  on  t  (4999,  one-tailed  test)).
ble.  This  is  followed  by  the  orientation  of  the  country
path  =  0.163,  t-value  =  5.197),  ﬁrm  size  (path  =  0.081,  t-
alue  =  3.045)  and  industry  (path  =  0.052,  t-value  =  2.028).
We  apply  the  Stone-Geisser  test  (Chin,  1998) to  corrobo-
ate  the  predictive  relevance  of  the  model.  The  Q2  statistic
m
l
r
tf  this  test  is  above  the  minimum  threshold  of  0  (Q2  =  0.193).
herefore,  the  results  conﬁrm  the  predictive  relevance  of
he  dependent  variable.
We  also  run  the  regression  considering  if  the  company
elongs  to  a  socially  sensitive  industry,  to  check  if  our  main
esult  holds  for  this  additional  model  (the  results  of  this
egression  are  not  reported  for  the  sake  of  brevity).  We
ound  that  board  effectiveness  continue  to  have  a  positive
nd  signiﬁcant  effect  on  the  stakeholder  perspective.  The
est  of  the  independent  variables  have  similar  signiﬁcance
nd  signs  as  in  the  ﬁrst  model,  unless  the  new  industry  vari-
ble,  which  is  non-signiﬁcant.
iscussion
ur  main  result  indicates  that  board  effectiveness  posi-
ively  inﬂuences  the  transparency  of  sustainability  reports
s  a  proxy  for  the  stakeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s
orporate  governance.  As  expected,  this  relationship  shows
hat  board  effectiveness  under  the  shareholder  perspec-
ive  of  corporate  governance  is  also  a  valid  construct  under
he  stakeholder  perspective.  This  result  implies  that  boards
ffective  in  protecting  shareholder  value  are  also  effective
n  responding  to  the  interests  of  the  rest  of  the  ﬁrm’s  stake-
olders.
Our  main  ﬁnding  is  consistent  with  that  of  Webb  (2004),
ho  found  that  boards  of  socially  responsible  ﬁrms  have
ore  outside  and  female  directors,  and  their  CEO  is  less-
ikely  to  be  the  chairperson  than  boards  in  non-socially
esponsible  companies.  Based  on  her  ﬁndings,  she  suggested
hat  the  causal  relationship  between  these  characteristics  of
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board  structure  and  being  a  socially  responsible  ﬁrms  should
be  analyzed.  Our  result  partially  contribute  to  this  call,  as
we  found  that  board  effectiveness  in  protecting  shareholder
interests,  which  includes  the  characteristics  reported  by
Webb  (2004),  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  ﬁrm’s  response
to  stakeholder  interests.  Our  ﬁnding  is  also  consistent  with
the  result  of  Ntim  and  Soobaroyen  (2013), who  found  that
better-governed  ﬁrms  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  CSR  activ-
ities  and  that  a  combination  of  good  corporate  governance
mechanism,  such  as  board  of  directors,  and  good  CSR  prac-
tices  leads  to  higher  ﬁnancial  performance.
Our  ﬁndings  also  suggest  that,  although  the  shareholder
and  the  stakeholder  perspectives  might  initially  be  consid-
ered  as  opposing  approaches  (Letza  et  al.,  2004),  this  is  not
the  case.  Consistently  with  Money  and  Schepers  (2007),  our
results  indicate  that  these  approaches  have  a  similar  orien-
tation  but  they  differ  in  scope.  The  shareholder  perspective
shows  a  narrow  scope.  It  considers  that  corporate  gov-
ernance  mechanisms  should  only  contribute  to  protecting
shareholder  interests  and  increasing  ﬁrm  value.  In  contrast,
the  stakeholder  perspective  shows  a  wider  scope  and  consid-
ers  that  the  ﬁrm’s  corporate  governance  mechanisms  should
guarantee  the  interests  of  all  the  stakeholders.  This  perspec-
tive  includes  shareholders  as  a  speciﬁc  type  of  stakeholders.
Our  ﬁndings  show  that  the  scope  of  board  effectiveness
broadens  as  the  perspective  of  corporate  governance  broad-
ens.  Our  result  reinforces  the  idea  that  shareholder  interests
are  also  advocated  under  the  emergent  stakeholder  perspec-
tive.
Our  results  may  also  be  explained  by  the  fact  that
the  interests  of  shareholders  are  expanding  and  these
shareholders  are  giving  greater  importance  to  CSR.  This  is
particularly  the  case  of  signiﬁcant  shareholders.  As  a  con-
sequence  of  their  long-term  interest  in  the  ﬁrm,  they  are
more  likely  to  invest  in  CSR  (Godos-Díez  et  al.,  2014).  In
addition,  these  shareholders  are  concerned  about  maintain-
ing  their  reputation,  which  is  closely  linked  to  that  of  their
corporations  and  may  be  preserved  through  CSR  (Anderson
et  al.,  2003).  Thus,  the  interests  of  shareholders  are  becom-
ing  partially  aligned  with  those  of  the  rest  of  stakeholders.
Therefore,  in  consonance  with  our  results,  when  a  board
of  directors  promotes  CSR  practices  and  reporting,  it  is  also
effective  in  considering  the  interests  of  signiﬁcant  sharehol-
ders  all  at  the  same  time.
All  of  the  control  variables  were  found  to  have  the
expected  signiﬁcant  and  positive  effect  on  the  stakeholder
perspective,  using  the  transparency  of  sustainability  reports
as  a  proxy.  Consistent  with  previous  research  (Fifka,  2013;
Hahn  and  Kühnen,  2013),  we  found  that  larger  companies
are  more  likely  to  offer  more  transparent  CSR  information.
Firms  operating  in  environmentally-sensitive  industries  also
produce  more  transparent  sustainability  reports.  As  Young
and  Marais  (2012)  concluded,  companies  belonging  to  these
industries  provide  better  CSR  reporting  to  gain  legitimacy.
Finally,  ﬁrms  from  stakeholder-oriented  countries  publish
more  transparent  sustainability  reports.  This  result  corrob-
orates  that  of  Simnett  et  al.  (2009),  who  reported  that
companies  from  those  countries  assure  their  sustainability
reports  more.  It  also  corroborates  the  result  of  Young  and
Marais  (2012),  who  found  that  companies  from  stakeholder-
oriented  countries  disclose  better  CSR  information  than  do
those  from  shareholder-oriented  countries.
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onclusions
n  this  paper,  we  study  whether  boards  effective  in  protec-
ing  shareholder  interests  are  also  effective  in  guaranteeing
he  interests  of  the  rest  of  the  ﬁrm’s  stakeholders.  To  do
o,  we  developed  a  measure  of  board  effectiveness,  based
n  the  shareholder  perspective,  and  analyzed  whether  it
lso  promotes  the  stakeholder  perspective  of  the  ﬁrm’s  cor-
orate  governance.  We  used  transparency  of  sustainability
eports  as  a  proxy  for  the  stakeholder  perspective  and  we
stablished  a  structural  equation  model  that  was  estimated
hrough  a  PLS  regression.  Using  a sample  of  2366  companies
rom  17  countries,  we  found  that  board  effectiveness  has  a
ositive  and  signiﬁcant  effect  on  the  stakeholder  perspec-
ive  of  the  ﬁrm’s  corporate  governance.  Additionally,  we
ound  that  large  ﬁrms,  ﬁrms  that  operate  in  environmentally
ensitive  industries  and  ﬁrms  that  are  from  countries  with
 stakeholder-oriented  system  of  corporate  governance  are
ore  likely  to  address  the  interests  of  all  of  the  ﬁrm’s  stake-
olders  by  issuing  more  transparent  sustainability  reports.
CSR  is  an  important  element  in  corporate  strategy  that
an  lead  to  competitive  advantages,  innovation  and  oppor-
unities  (McWilliams  et  al.,  2006;  Porter  and  Kramer,  2006;
mith,  2003).  Additionally,  some  studies  point  out  that
nancial  markets  value  the  disclosure  of  transparent  sus-
ainability  reports  (Reverte,  2012;  Carnevale  et  al.,  2012).
n  the  other  hand,  our  main  result  indicates  that  effective
oards  of  directors  contribute  to  guaranteeing  the  inter-
sts  of  the  rest  of  the  stakeholders  as  well  as  those  of  the
hareholders  themselves.  So  the  premise  that  CSR,  based  on
he  consideration  of  all  of  a  ﬁrm’s  stakeholders,  only  repre-
ents  a  cost  that  should  be  avoided  seems  to  not  be  the  case
nymore.
Based  on  our  results,  the  contribution  of  this  paper  to
he  literature  on  corporate  governance  is  two-fold.  First
f  all,  we  demonstrate  that  board  effectiveness  based  on
he  shareholder  perspective  of  corporate  governance  may
lso  be  applied  to  the  stakeholder  perspective.  Board  effec-
iveness  can  be  asserted  to  promote  the  protection  of  the
nterests  of  all  the  stakeholders  of  a  ﬁrm,  within  which
he  shareholders  conform  a  particular  group.  As  Money
nd  Schepers  (2007:8)  claimed:  ‘‘there  is  an  increasing
wareness  that  there  cannot  be  shareholder  value  without
takeholder  value.’’
Secondly,  we  respond  to  ‘‘the  need  for  a better
nderstanding  of  all  elements  that  determine  board  effec-
iveness’’  (Van  den  Berghe  and  Levrau,  2004:461).  To  our
nowledge,  this  paper  is  a  ﬁrst  attempt  to  capture  and  mea-
ure  board  effectiveness  in  a  single  variable.  We  establish  a
easurement  model  for  board  effectiveness  using  the  demo-
raphic  characteristics  of  boards  previously  found  to  have
ffected  board  task  performance.
In  addition,  this  paper  speciﬁcally  contributes  to  research
n  the  relationship  between  CSR  reporting  and  boards
f  directors.  We  demonstrated  that  companies  with  more
ffective  boards  tend  to  provide  more  transparent  sustaina-
ility  reports.
Finally,  our  results  have  implications  for  policy  makers.
any  characteristics  of  boards  that  drive  board  effec-
iveness  (e.g.,  a  majority  of  outsiders,  increased  female
epresentation,  CEO-chairman  separation,  the  establish-
ent  of  committees,  etc.)  are  suggested  in  Codes  of  Best
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D58  
ractices  all  over  the  world  (Adams  and  Ferreira,  2009;
enis  and  Mcconnell,  2014).  We  have  demonstrated  that,
y  introducing  these  recommendations,  codes  may  improve
oard  effectiveness  to  protect  the  interests  of  all  the  stake-
olders  of  a  company,  including  those  of  the  shareholders.
These  ﬁndings  should  be  viewed  in  light  of  some  lim-
tations.  All  of  the  ﬁrms  analyzed  are  public  because
nformation  on  boards  of  directors  of  non-listed  companies  is
ot  easily  accessible.  Shareholders  are  important  stakehol-
ers  for  those  ﬁrms  that  ﬁnancially  depend  on  the  market.
ur  results  may  be  inﬂuenced  by  the  relevance  of  share-
olders  as  a  speciﬁc  group  of  stakeholders  in  our  sample.
dditionally,  mainstream  corporate  governance  research
ostulates  that  board  behavior  and  processes  are  more  crit-
cal  than  demographic  characteristics  in  determining  board
ffectiveness  (Forbes  and  Milliken,  1999;  Minichilli  et  al.,
009,  2012).  This  study  represents  a  ﬁrst  attempt  to  capture
oard  effectiveness  in  a  single  variable,  so  we  used  demo-
raphic  variables  because  they  are  more  objective  and  may
e  directly  measured  (Pfeffer,  1983).  Finally,  we  note  that
he  dependent  and  independent  variables  refer  to  the  same
ime  period.  This  could  affect  the  capacity  to  infer  causal-
ty.  We  built  our  variables  by  gathering  information  from  the
ears  2009--2012.  The  use  of  lagged  data  for  the  indepen-
ent  variables  would  not  have  been  a  solution.  Some  years
ould  continue  to  be  included  in  both  types  of  variables.
oreover,  this  could  have  reduced  the  size  of  the  sample
iven  that  data  on  board  characteristics  of  some  ﬁrms  was
navailable  for  the  year  2008.
This  paper  offers  directions  for  future  research.  First,
he  sample  should  be  extended  by  including  non-listed  cor-
orations  to  check  for  possible  differences  between  quoted
nd  non-quoted  ﬁrms.  Second,  it  would  be  interesting  to
evelop  a  measurement  model  of  board  effectiveness  based
n  behavioral  and  procedural  aspects  of  the  board  and  check
ts  correlation  with  the  measurement  model  presented  in
his  paper.  Additionally,  we  analyzed  how  board  effective-
ess,  under  the  shareholder  perspective,  impacts  on  the
takeholder  perspective.  Future  research  should  analyze
hether  the  causal  relationship  could  also  be  the  oppo-
ite:  whether  being  concerned  about  stakeholder  interests
ould  be  a  precursor  of  effectively  responding  to  shareholder
nterests.  Finally,  the  use  of  PLS  also  provides  another  course
f  research.  This  technique  quantiﬁes  the  value  of  the  latent
ariable  board  effectiveness  for  each  company.  So,  it  could
rove  interesting  to  analyze  whether  industry  or  geographic
actors  inﬂuence  this  variable.
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